Vector clocks (VC) axe an inherent component of a rich class of distributed applications. In this paper, we consider the problem of realistic --more specifically, bounded-space and fault-tolerant--implementation of these client applications. To this end, we generalize the notion of VC to resettable vector clocks (RVC), and provide a realistic implementation of RVC. Further, we identify an interface contract under which our RVC implementation can be substituted for VC in client applications, without affecting the client's correctness. Based on such substitution, we show how to transform the client so that it is itself realistically implemented; we demonstrate our method in the context of Ricart-Agrawala's mutual exclusion program.
INTRODUCTION
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Applications that use VC may require unbounded space since vector clocks grow unboundedly. To realistically implement VC applications using bounded space, VC should also be bounded, which leads us to make two observations about VC. First, VC often consumes more space than is necessary by requiring that a "fresh timestamp" be associated with every send, receive and local event of the client application. But most clients causally compare only certain events, and VC correctness is preserved by freshly timestamping only these events; the remaining events could therefore reuse the current timestamp. Second, and more importantly, many applications are structured in phases and track causality only within a bounded number of adjacent phases. This suggests another way to reuse timestamps: augment VC with a "nonblocking reset" operation that lets an application process locally reset its own local clock whenever it moves from one phase to another. By using a resettable vector clock component (RVC) instead of VC, often a bounded number of clock values suffice.
Fault-tolerance is another essential ingredient of realistic implementation of applications. As such, substituting VC with bounded-space RVC is not enough; RVC should also be fault-tolerant. The issues of boundedness and fault-tolerance are interrelated. One might argue that using a 64-bit register for a clock value should suffice for bounding most applications; in the presence of faults however this argument does not hold. E.g., if clocks are improperly initialized or lose coordination, they may reach their maximum value quickly. Or, as Jayaram and Varghese [9] have shown, simultaneous occurrence of process crash and message reorder can drive applications into arbitrary states, including ones where all space is used up. Moreover, when simple faults such as reboot of the application process occur, the coordination between vector clocks may be disrupted and the tracking of the causality relation may become incorrect. Hence, for an RVC application to tolerate such faults, it is necessary that RVC enjoy some fault-tolerance properties.
In this paper, we consider two problems related to realistic implementation of VC applications. The first problem (which we call the RVC problem) deals with how to substitute VC with a bounded-space and fault-tolerant RVC with-out affecting application correctness. Since not every application that uses VC can instead use bounded-space RVC, a related issue is to find a contract that an application needs to satisfy in order to permit this substitution. Our goals in solving the RVC problem are as follows. The identified contract should be minimal, so many applications will naturally satisfy it. Verification of whether an application satisfies the contract should be easy; if an application does not satisfy the contract, the application should be easily modified so as to satisfy it. Also for the sake of efficiency, the RVC implementation should not generate extra messages or block the application in the absence of faults. And lastly, in the presence of faults, the RVC implementation should recover from arbitrary states to states from where it correctly tracks the causality relation; this sort of fault-tolerance is commonly referred to as stabilizing fault-tolerance.
The second problem deals with how to transform VC applications into fault-tolerant ones, using RVC as a building block. To this end, we use a method that is based on the following observation: In any application that uses a component, faults occur at three levels: (1) in the component, (2) in the application, or (3) in the interface between the component and the application. Our method deals with these three levels separately, as follows.
For level (1) , the component needs to recover itself to a consistent state. For this purpose, the component provides one or more operations that restore itself to a consistent state. Thus, in level (1), the component invokes one of its operations to restore itself to a consistent state. Since the new state of the component may not be consistent with the state of the application, the component raises an exception to the application; the application can provide one or more exception handlers to deal with exceptions raised by the component.
For level (2) , the application needs to restore itself to a consistent state. Moreover, it also needs to ensure that the state of the component is consistent with its own state. Since the application is not aware of the internal details of the component, the application can only invoke the operations of the component for this purpose. Therefore, for level (2), the application chooses to correct its own state and/or to force the component to change its state appropriately by calling operations in the component.
For level (3) , which may arise even when the application and the component are both internally consistent (but they are mutually inconsistent), detection is performed by the component or the application. Here, the method optimistically tries to deal with the fault by assuming that the application and the component are in internally consistent states. Therefore, if the component detects an interface fault, it raises an exception to the application. The application, upon receiving such exception or upon detecting an interface fault, invokes component operation(s) so that the component reaches another consistent state whereby mutual consistency is regained. (Should the optimistic assumption of internal consistency be invalid, the mechanisms that deal with levels (1) and (2) will eventually resolve the internal inconsistency.)
Contributions of the paper.
We give a boundedspace implementation of the VC component, and show how to make it stabilizing fault-tolerant. Further, we show that any application that uses VC can instead use our implementation without loss of correctness, provided that the application satisfies a two-part contract. Each part gives a lower bound on minimum size of VC; the size of our implementation matches the maximum of these two bounds. The first part identifies the temporal localities within which the application tracks event causality; the bound on clock size is directly proportional to the size of these temporal localities. The second part identifies how often processes communicate; the bound is inversely proportional to the frequency of communication.
Finally, we use Ricart and Agrawala's mutual exclusion [14] as an illustration of our method for transforming a VC-based application to a bounded-space, stabilizing fault-tolerant version thereof. To the best of our knowledge, prior implementations for Ricart-Agrawala's mutual exclusion have lacked bounded-space and stabilizing tolerance.
Related work. Mostefaoui and Theel [13] have presented a solution that reduces the size of the vector clock. In their solution, whenever any clock reaches a predetermined limit, the application is blocked and the clocks of all processes are reset to zero. An unbounded variable phase is maintained to count the number of resets that have been performed. By maintaining a single phase, the size of the vector clock is reduced. However, because additional messages are sent which change the clock values, the causality relation in the underlying application is changed. Also, their solution is neither bounded-space nor stabilizing fault-tolerant. By way of contrast, our solution achieves both.
Awerbuch, Patt-Sbamir and Varghese [3] have addressed the problem of bounding the registers used in network protocols. In their approach, reaching the bound is considered to be a fault and, therefore, a global blocking reset operation is invoked to reset the application. By way of contrast, we allow nonblocking resets to be performed by a process when it reaches the bound of its local clock, without treating this scenario as a fault or affecting the application correctness. Furthermore we enable application stabilization via RVC stabilization, whereas in [3] the application is assumed to be stabilizing and transforming the registers to be bounded is shown to preserve application stabilization.
In contrast to our mutual exclusion program, the original version due to Ricart and Agrawala [14] uses O(log n) space per process, where n is the number of processes, and is not stabilizing fault-tolerant. Mizuno et. al. [12] gave a stabilizing version, but their solution uses unbounded state. Our solution uses O(n log n) space per process.
Organization of this paper. In Section 2, we present the preliminaries. We formally define the RVC problem in Section 3. In Section 4, we specify the contract, and present our bounded-space implementation of RVC. We show how this implementation is made stabilizing tolerant to transient faults in Section 5. In Section 6, we use the bounded-space and fault-tolerant RVC to provide a bounded and stabilizing fault-tolerant implementation of the mutual exclusion solution by Ricart and Agrawala [14] . Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the system model, faults, stabilizing fault-tolerance, and introduce the notations to be used in the rest of the paper.
System model.
A program consists of a set of processes which communicate via message passing on interpro-cess channels. Execution is asynchronous, i.e., every process executes at its own speed and messages in the channels are subject to arbitrary but finite transmission delays. We assume that the processes are connected but we do not assume that they should be fully connected. We do not assume the channels to be FIFO or bidirectional (unless the application requires so).
Process execution consists of a sequence of events. Each event is the execution of some process action and is in one of three forms: local event, message send event, or message receive event. An action is an atomic and terminating statement that updates 0 or more program variables and calls 0 or more component operations. Lamport's [10] happened before (causality) relation hb, induces a partial order on the set of events; it is the smallest transitive relation that satisfies the following two conditions:
• for any two events e and f, if e and f are events on the same process and e occurred before f, then e hb f
• for any two events e and f, if e is a send event in one process and f is the corresponding receive event in another process, then e hb f.
Events e and f are concurrent, denoted as e c_o f, iff both e h_b. ff and f h._b_e are false, i.e., e c._o f ~ ~(e h__b_ ff) A
~(ff hb e) •
Semantically, a program is defined by its set of computations. A computation is an alternating sequence of states and events whose projection on the events extends the causality relation. A state gives a value for each variable (chosen from its respective domain), and the sequence of messages in each channel.
Faults. In our model, messages can be corrupted, lost, or duplicated at any time. Moreover, processes (respectively channels) can be improperly initialized, fail, recover, or their state could be transiently (and arbitrarily) corrupted at any time. For ease of exposition, we assume the number of fault occurrences is finite.
Stabilizing fault-tolerance.
A program P is stabilizing fault-tolerant iff starting from an arbitrary state P eventually recovers to a state from where its specification is satisfied.
Component.
A component consists of an interface and an implementation. The interface consists of a nonempty set of values and a set of operation names. Associated with each operation is a list of arguments. The implementation consists of an operation body for each operation. When an operation is invoked, its body is executed atomically and always terminates.
Notation.
In this paper, we use i,j, and k to denote processes. We use e and f to denote events. Where needed, events are subscripted with the process at which they occur, thus, ej is an event at j. We use m to denote messages.
Messages are subscripted by the sender process, thus, mj is a message sent by j.
A formula (op e, f : R.e.f : X.e.f) denotes the value obtained by performing the (commutative and associative) op on the X.e.f values for all e, f that satisfy R.e.f. As 
THE PROBLEM OF RESETTABLE VECTOR CLOCKS
In this section, we formally define the Resettable Vector Clocks problem. Towards this end, we first present the interface of VC and then show how this interface is extended to obtain the interface of RVC. Subsequently, we formally define what it means for RVC to be substitutable for VC.
To illustrate the definitions, we use a variation of RicartAgrawala mutual exclusion that uses VC, namely RA, as a running example.
RVC interface.
The interface of RVC subsumes that of VC so we begin with VC. The values in the interface consists of a vector; each element in the vector is a timestamp. The operations in the interface of VC are as follows:
• constructor(process_idJ.ist)
• send( sender_id, event, message, flag )
• receive( receiver_id, event, message, flag )
• local-event( process_id, event, flag )
• happened-before( event1, event2 ) : boolean
• concurrent ( event1, event2 ) : boolean 1
For the reader's convenience we give an implementation of VC in the Appendix. Note that the above interface is more general than the traditional one in that, a boolean argument flag is associated with the send, receive, and local-event operations to indicate whether or not a fresh timestamp is to be given to the event as opposed to the current timestamp. The intuition behind this generalization is that applications that use VC compare only certain events of interest, and only these events of interest need to be freshly timestamped rather than all the events. For example, in the case of causal broadcast, the only events whose timestamps are compared are the send events, and only these need to be freshly timestamped; the receive or local events do not need to be freshly timestamped.
The interface of RVC modifies the constructor to include a client contract (see Section 4.1) as an extra argument, it also includes these additional operations:
• nonblocking-reset( process_id ): This operation resets the local clock value of the given process without introducing extra communication messages or blocking. Other processes learn about this reset gradually.
iRemark. Since the implementation of the "concurrent" -~(f hb e))) we will not discuss its implementation any further in this paper.
• global-reset ( ) : This operation performs a blocking reset for all processes and introduces extra communication messages. This operation is not required in the absence of faults, and invoked only upon the detection of a fault.
Let P be a program and D be a subset of the process actions of P.
Definition. P is a well-formed client ofVC (RVC) iff (1) Case Study. In RA, whenever j wants to enter the critical section, CS, it sends a timestamped REQUEST message to all the processes. When a process k receives a REQUEST message from j, it defers the REPLY message to j if[ k has requested CS with a lower timestamp than j's request.
Otherwise, k sends a REPLY message to j. j enters the CS after it has received REPLY messages from all other processes. When j exits CS, it sends all the deferred REPLY messages.
In RA, j maintains the following variables.
• REQ_ts.j: the timestamp of the last REQ UEST at j.
• deferred_set.j: the set of processes that j has to send a REPLY when it releases the CS.
• REPLY.j.k: j's REPLYto k.
• RECVD.j.k: last REPLYj received from k.
• CS.j: a boolean denoting whether or not j is currently accessing CS.
• hungry.j: a boolean which is true if[ j is requesting for CS and has not completed its CS.
RA uses the process-iris to induce a total order over the events it compares. We implement this as follows:
less-than ( ej, fk ) : boolean return ( happened-before( ej, fh )V (concurrent( e~, h ) ^ (J < k )));
Since RA compares only Request CSevents, only these events are freshly timestamped by calling the local-event operation with flag = True. For all the other events, since we do not need fresh timestamps, we call the corresponding operations with flag = False. We denote these "don't care" events with the symbol "*". Therefore, the resulting process actions for j are as follows. 
Case study (continued).
In RA, the processes loop through Request CS, CS granted (action 4), and Release CS.
Since each loop execution can be seen as a new phase, we can select any of these three actions as the distinguished action of RA. We identify the Release CS as the distinguished action of RA, and append it with a call to nonblocking-reset operation for j. We denote the resulting program, which is a reset annotation of RA at the Release CS action, as RAp.
Note that 1:tAD is a well-formed client of RVC.
Definition. Let P be a well-formed client of VC. RVC is substitutable for VC in P iff there exists a set D such that every event in PD that is an execution of happened-before returns the same result as the corresponding event in P. D Intuitively, the definition states that RVC is substitutable for VC in P iff the set of computations (i.e., the correctness) of P is not affected by that substitution.
The RVC problem. Design a bounded-space and stabilizing fault-tolerant RVC implementation and identify a contract C such that, for every P that is a well-formed client of VC and that satisfies C, RVC is substitutable for VC in P. []
definition of substitutability and reset annotation, our transformation disallows any changes to the nature of the client program, such as the introduction of extra causalities in the absence of faults. Without having this second condition, one might consider a trivial solution to our substitutability problem such as: "RVC blocks the client program when the clock entry for a process is filled up and resets this clock entry on all the processes". This is not an acceptable solution because it introduces extra causalities which were not present in the original program, and the definition for substitutability is violated, since the happened-before operation for the blocking RVC does not return the same result as that of VC for all the events that any client can compare.
Case study (continued). The outline of the rest of the case study is as follows. In the next section, we demonstrate that RA satisfies a contract for using bounded-space RVC and, hence, a bounded-space RVC is substitutable for VC in RA. Likewise, in Section 5, we show that a bounded-space and stabilizing fault-tolerant RVC is substitutable for VC in RA. Based on this substitution and the method discussed in the Introduction, in Section 6 we show how to transform RA to be itself bounded-space and stabilizing fault-tolerant.
BOUNDED-SPACE RESETTABLE VECTOR CLOCKS
In this section, we present a bounded implementation of RVC and identify a contract that should be satisfied for the clients to use this component; the contract consists of two parts: 1) a comparison predicate over the events whose causality needs to be tracked, and 2) a communication pattern between the processes. Finally, we present the main theorem, namely the substitutability of VC with boundedspace RVC.
Contract
Need for a comparison predicate. Consider an application that needs to compare any two events in its computation. Since the total number of events may be unbounded, the application cannot use bounded vector clocks. In other words, the application must provide some predicate, say R, such that it will need to compare two events e and f only if R(e, f) is true.
Need for a communication pattern. In order to provide a bounded implementation of vector clocks, it is necessary that processes communicate often enough. Consider a scenario where e is a send event at j and f is the corresponding receive event at k; clearly, e hb f. If j does an unbounded number of resets without ever communicating with k then there exists an event e' at j such that the timestamps associated with e and e' axe the same. Note that e' is concurrent with f. As far as k is concerned it cannot differentiate between e and e ~. Therefore, if k receives a message with timestamp e', it will update its clock incorrectly.
The problem with this scenario is that k is not aware of an unbounded number of resets done by j. Therefore, for an application to use a bounded implementation of vector clocks, it must satisfy a communication pattern that guarantees the number of resets of j that k is not aware of is bounded. Likewise, it is also necessary that the number of reset events that a process can perform while a message is in transit is bounded; if a message m stays in a channel for a long enough time such that a message m' with identical timestamp is created, then the receiving process cannot update its clock appropriately.
Comparison predicate
Let ej and fk be events in some computation of Pp.
Definition. PRm.ej denotes the m ~h distinguished event before ej at process j. NX n.e~ denotes the n ~h distinguished event after ej at j. 
[ R(m,n).ej.fk----(PRm.ej h__b~ fk A ~(NXn.ej h_b_ f~)) ]
The client program can choose suitable values for m and n depending upon the comparison relation that is satisfied between events whose causality it needs to track. such that the x th distinguished event at j happened before ek, and ek happened before the (x--bl) ~h distinguished event of j.
(2) Let m' be a message in transit from i to k when j performs its x th distinguished event. If m' is a request message, i is requesting for critical section and if m' is a reply message then k is requesting for critical section. Unless m' is delivered, the requesting process cannot access its critical section. Using the result of bounded overtaking by RicartAgrawala, we now show that before j's (x--b2) th distinguished event, m' is delivered. For simplicity, let us assume that m' is a request message. If m' is a reply message, the same argument applies with i replaced by k. Ricart-Agrawala have shown that if i is requesting for critical section then j cannot access its critical section twice before i accesses its critical section. When j requests the critical section (x--l-l) ~h time, i is already requesting for critical section. Therefore, before j can enter the critical section for the (x--l-2) th time, i must access its critical section and, hence, m' must be delivered. In sum, any message in transit when j performs its x th distinguished event, is delivered before j's (x-l-2) ~h distinguished event.
It follows from (1) and (2) 
Bounded-Space RVC Implementation
The implementation of RVC extends that of VC as follows. Proof.
This proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we show that the condition phase_bound _> max(m -tn -1 , 3M -t-1) is sufficient for RVC to update the clock values correctly when PD uses RVC. Then, in the second part, we show that that condition is also sufficient for RVC to keep track of the causality relation correctly when it is used by PD. More specifically, in the second part, we show that if the contract is satisfied then any two events ej and fk that P compares, "happened-before(ej, .fk)" of RVC returns the bounded phase, these conditions are captured in the "happened-before" operation of RVC as follows:
• Since ph'.fk .j is in the range ph'.ej .j---(m-1 
j -(m-l)). This condition is
Captured by the third disjunction of the "happenedbefore" operation of RVC. []
Case study (continued).
Theorem 4. A bounded-space RVC with the constructor (p_ids, R(3, 2), 2, 2) is substitutable for VC in RA.
Proof. This proof follows trivially from Lemmas 1, 2 aJld Theorem 3. [] Note that, the minimum phase_bound of RVC substitutable for VC in RA is max(3 + 2 -1 , 3.2 + 1) = 7. Therefore, the resulting RA application uses only bounded space.
STABILIZING RESETTABLE VECTOR CLOCKS
The stabilization of RVC consists of a local detection of the violation of the invariant for RVC followed by an invocation of the global reset operation of RVC. Even though the contract might be temporarily violated in the presence of faults, the stabilization of RVC assumes that the client will eventually start re-satisfying the contract. 
The above predicate states that due to the communication pattern when any process j receives a message m, the timestamp of m is within some range of the clock values at j . Whenever this invariant is violated, that is, whenever a process receives an "out of range message" with respect to the clock value of any other process, the local detection fires and calls the global-reset operation to correct the component state. We insert this detector at the beginning of the receive operation.
Bound on the number of phases. If the "phase_bound?'
is not sufficiently large, there may exist a cycle among the processes which causes the processes to bump up their phase values infinitely without the local detection mechanism firing. For stabilizing fault-tolerance we increase the phase_bound for RVC to be at least "max(re+n-i, (BE+2N-1)M+I)" where B is the bound on the channel capacity, E is the number of channels, N is the number of processes, and M, m, and n are contract parameters as before.
Note that rather than using a local detection, one could alternatively perform global snapshots [4] to detect a violation of the invariant for RVC. Although it would improve the bound on the number of phases, we rule out this solution to avoid the communication overhead it introduces.
Theorem 5.
The modified bounded RVC is stabilizing fault-tolerant. [] The proof for stabilization of the modified RVC consists of two parts. In the first part, we show that since the modified phase.bound is sufficiently large, there cannot be any cycle among the ph.k.j variables for any j and k. In the second part, we show that when the component is in a faulty state, either the detector fires and the component is corrected with a global reset, or the component stabilizes at most within phase_bound nonblocking resets of every process. While the detailed proof is included in [5] , we would like to note that it assumed for the stabilization of RVC that the application performs enough number of resets. Therefore we identify this condition as an additional contract to be satisfied by the application in order for RVC to recover from faults. 
CASE STUDY (CONTINUED): STABILIZING RA
In this section, we use the method described in the Introduction to design stabilizing tolerance to the RA application which consists of VC and its client (main module in RA).
As discussed in the Introduction, we consider three levels of faults (1) in the main module of RA, (2) in the VC component and (3) in the interface between RA and VC. We discuss these three levels in Section 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 respectively.
Stabilization of the main module
In order to design stabilizing-tolerance to the main module in RA, we exploit its specification. RA ensures that once a process requests for CS, it is guaranteed to enter CS within a dertain period of time (i.e., (N-l) * (the maximum time it takes to grant CS to a process + the maximum time a process can stay in CS) ). Therefore, we can detect any inconsistency in the main module by using a "timeout" mechanism.
Whenever a process j calls the REQUEST CS action, we start the timer for j, and whenever j is granted the CS we reset this timer. That is, we append the line start-tlmer(j) to action 1, and append reset-timer(j) to action 4 of RA.
When a timeout occurs for some process, a recovery is possible by using a global reset that resets the main module (the main module in turn resets the RVC) to a predetermined consistent state. However, we can achieve a lower-cost solution as follows. The detection of a timeout implies that a process is incorrectly deferred by some other process. After executing a Release CS, a process j cannot incorrectly defer any process since it does not defer any process at all.
Note that if we execute a Release CS for any process that timeouts, after some time there will not be any process j incorrectly deferred by another process k; either j will timeout and perform a new Request CS, or k will timeout (or execute CS) and undefer j. Therefore, we add the following action to RA.
I { timeout(j) } ~ Release CS(j); Request CS(j);

Stabilization of VC
By using Corollary 7 we substitute VC with a boundedspace and stabilizing-tolerant RVC in RA. Note that the stabilizing-tolerant RVC relies on its client to perform a sufficient number of reset events at every process, in turn it guarantees that within that many reset events it starts capturing the causality relation correctly. Since the main module neger ceases to perform reset events for any process (even in a deadlock situation~ a timeout leads to a Release CS and therefore a reset event), the RVC component stabilizes within some number (i.e., phase_bound) of reset events at every process. Also if RVC detects an inconsistency, it invokes its global-reset operation and raises an exception to the main module which in turn releases CS in order to start fresh and synchronized with RVC.
Stabilization of the interface invariant
The specification for RA includes the following condition:
Note that this condition is also an interface invariant between the main module and RVC. It may be the case that both the main module and RVC are internally consistent but the above condition is false; the requests of processes (i.e.,
REQ~s variables) of the main module may have incorrect values rather than the values assigned to them by RVC.
Since we are only interested in stabilizing-tolerance (rather than a masking-tolerance where the effects of a fault should be masked immediately), we do not try to detect this inconsistency. Instead we ensure that in RA the inconsistencies at the interface are corrected eventually. It may be the case that an interface fault is detected by RVC; the incorrect REQts values invoke the local detection mechanism since they are out of the valid range. In this case, the application (hence the interface invariant) stabilizes as discussed in Section 6.2. If that is not the case, the interface invariant stabilizes after all the processes request for new CS executions, since the new requests will get a correct value from RVC.
We assumed without loss of generality that both the main module and RVC has been stabilized, since otherwise Sections 6.1 and 6.2 would apply. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Broadly speaking, this paper addresses issues in the systematic design of fault-tolerant component-based applications. Our experience is that by making the components themselves fault-tolerant and by exploiting a contract between the application and the component, design of application fault-tolerance is simplified. In other words, compositional design of fault-tolerance is potentially simpler than monolithic design of fault-tolerance.
More specifically, we presented a generalization of VC, namely RVC, based on the observation that in many applications (a) causality comparisons are performed for only a small subset of the events, and (b) comparisons are between events that occur within some number of adjacent "phases" of application execution. Observation (a) led to the simplification that only the events that are causally compared are freshly timestamped. Observation (b) led to the introduction of nonblocking resets; thus both enabled the reuse of timestamps.
We solved two problems, the first of which deals with how to design a bounded-space and fault-tolerant RVC. The second problem deals with how to design fanlt-tolerance in an application that uses VC, based on the substitution of VC with RVC.
For the first problem, we argued that applications need to satisfy a nontrivial contract in order to use a bounded-space RVC. We identified one such contract, which consists of a comparison predicate R(rn, n) and a communication pattern comm (M,l) . For this contract, we presented a boundedspace and stabilizing fault-tolerant RVC implementation. The space bound depends on the parameters m, n, M, l and the system size (i.e., B,E,N); the stronger the contract, i.e. the smaller the parameter values, the smaller the space bound. The contract is readily satisfied by phase-based applications where events are compared only within some number of adjacent phases and each phase uses a standard communication pattern such as a diffusing computation over FIFO channels or heartbeat messages over time-bounded channels. In these applications, non-blocking resets are inserted when a process moves from one phase to another. Once the designer determines where the reset points are, it is easy to verify for what parameter values the contract is satisfied. Also, as discussed in Section 4, even if the application does not satisfy the contract it could be modified to do so.
Elsewhere [2] , we have identified other contracts that an application may satisfy in order to use RVC. More specifically, we have shown that if the communication pattern requirement is strengthened so that between M resets of j, each process directly receives a message from j, the size of each entry in the RVC can be made independent of the system size. Moreover, if the communication pattern is dropped (i.e., if M = I = cx~), it is still possible to bound the timestamps, although the implementation itself may be unbounded.
For the second problem, we argued that fault-tolerance in a component-based application involves dealing with faults in three different levels: in the component, in the application, or in the interface between the two. We presented a method that deals with these levels, and demonstrated the method by transforming Ricart-Agrawala's mutual exclusion program [14] to be both bounded-space and stabilizing fault-tolerant. Elsewhere [5] , we have also used the method to design an online, bounded-space and stabilizing faulttolerant version of Garg-Chase's transient predicate detector [8] . In both cases, prior solutions had lacked boundedspace and stabilizing fault-tolerance.
Our work suggests several directions for future work. For clock components, the problems to be studied include: (i) the design and use of bounded-space logical clock component; (ii) the design of multitolerance [1] in the RVC component, e.g. in the presence of limited faults such as process crashes, masking fault-tolerance is provided --causality is thus correctly tracked despite these faults--but in the presence of more general faults, only stabilizing fault-tolerance is provided; (iii) the design of local correction instead of global correction for RVC stabilization; and (iv) the design of fault-containing RVC, where the effect of the faulty state is contained to only a few processes. Regarding the problem of designing fault-tolerant applications, future work includes (i) methods that exploit the client-component contract to prove substitutability of a component by a fault-tolerant version thereof, and (ii) scalable techniques for verification of fault-tolerance in large scale applications.
